It is safe to say that the Line of Control (LoC) is witnessing some of its worst unrest in years. This is no surprise, given the dreadful state of the overall India-Pakistan relationship. In these tense moments, it is easy to forget that cross-border firing has happened not only during the worst of times in bilateral relations, but also during the best of times. In 2011 and 2012, a period of relative détente, there were dozens of violent cross-border exchanges — some of them deadly.

Cross-border firings are sadly routine in the India-Pakistan relationship. They are marked by a relentless regularity, immune to ceasefires or diplomatic breakthroughs. They happen because there is nothing to stop them from happening. Both sides know they can get away with them, particularly because they represent a form of limited conflict that falls far short of nuclear red lines. Cross-border firing is here to stay, come what may.

This is not to say LoC clashes should simply be shrugged off as an inevitable by-product of two embittered enemies’ enmity. Indeed, the intensity and lethality of this crossfire serves as a barometer of the state of their overall relationship. When bilateral ties are under control, cross-border violence is relatively modest. When they sink into deep crisis, it explodes.

In 2015, a rocky year for bilateral relations, there were over 400 ceasefire violations across other parts of the boundary between the two countries. In 2012, a year that brought a landmark visa agreement and ample cricket diplomacy, there were less than 80 LoC violations and 114 total violations. New Delhi contends Pakistan committed nearly 200 ceasefire violations during the first six months of 2015, compared to roughly 60 in all of 2011. Islamabad claims India did so nearly 130 times over just a two-month period in 2015.

This year, border violence skyrocketed amid soaring bilateral tensions. LoC violations cannot be ignored, and it is undoubtedly an immediate concern for the new Pakistani army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa. His former military colleagues recently told Al Jazeera that Bajwa might “try to arrange” a ceasefire — or “fight back with full force”, if India does not reduce its attacks or respect a truce.

Escalation is utterly undesirable. But new truces are unnecessary. India and Pakistan should take two key steps that will not end the border clashes, but will at least bring it under some semblance of control.

First, each side should take better advantage of the hotline arrangement, which currently enables military officials on both sides to speak only once per week. To be sure, dialogue does not preclude escalation, and it is no substitute for the government-to-government talks necessary to stabilise the overall relationship. Still, more military-to-military communication would provide opportunities to build trust and lower temperatures. This is particularly important, given that on the Pakistani side, the military calls the ultimate shots on India policy.

Second, each side should formalise, through a comprehensive written document, the 2003 ceasefire. True, it is routinely violated, but that does not mean it is inconsequential. While the annual number of total ceasefire violations in recent years may be in the hundreds, consider that in 2002 – the year before the truce went into effect – there were nearly 8,400.

We should be clear that the root causes of LoC firing and the tensions in the broader relationship relate to Kashmir, and to Pakistan’s links to anti-India terrorists. These matters will not be resolved anytime soon. To that end, dealing with LoC crossfire should be about conflict management, not conflict resolution. That is the most practical path forward to prevent the border clashes – and broader bilateral tensions – from spiralling dangerously out of control.


This article was originally published in the Herald's December 2016 issue. To read more subscribe to the Herald in print.


The writer is the senior program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.