In hindsight, it is clear as day, viginti/viginti.

Once the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had won the most number of seats in the 2008 general election, Asif Ali Zardari was going to be the next president of Pakistan. In fact, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto handed the reigns of the PPP to Zardari, the destiny of the man dubbed the ‘accidental president’ should have been clear.

But 54 months into a five-year term, it is easy to forget that in the summer of 2008, there was little clarity about Zardari’s personal political ambitions. Daily Dawn’s report on the then President Pervez Musharraf’s resignation on August 18, 2008 contained this telling line: “Coalition partners were left to consider who would be the next President, a position which most are in favour of curtailing and limiting.”

The Washington Post’s Islamabad correspondent also reflected on the uncertainty of the time, reporting on August 19, 2008: “Politicians began marathon meetings about possible replacements for Musharraf, with early reports suggesting a woman might be chosen.” Within days, though, it became obvious that Zardari himself aspired to the highest office in the land, also its second-most powerful office at the time thanks to the powers Musharraf had arrogated to the presidency during his eight years of being in charge. (The most powerful office was, and remains, that of the chief of army staff.)

Sworn in on September 9, 2008, an alternately beaming and sombre Zardari made it clear – as though further clarity was needed on this point – that his would be a presidency hard to decipher or assess. “I accept the presidency of Pakistan in the name of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto. I accept this in her name and in the name of all the martyrs of democracy,” President Zardari said at a press conference immediately after his swearing-in ceremony, standing next to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who he kept front and centre throughout the day’s proceedings.

Was Zardari sending some kind of a message by giving Karzai such prominence on his red-letter day? And if so, for whom was the message intended? To the Americans, that he intended to try and reset ties with Afghanistan, away from the army’s India-centric approach? Or to the army leadership, whose dislike and suspicion of Karzai at the time was well known, to send a signal that there was a new boss in town?

It never went explained — and crucially, there was no real follow-up to indicate what exactly President Zardari had in mind. And thus began a presidency that to this day remains largely inscrutable.

In heading off one crisis, Asif Ali Zardari’s chosen path has often, inadvertently perhaps though predictably, laid the grounds for the next crisis. To be sure, surviving five years in such a hostile environment is no small feat. But locked in a cause-and-effect cycle, the master tactician can also come across as a poor strategist.

Genius or survivor?

To his supporters, Zardari is the president who has steered the country through a perilous transition to democracy, taking Pakistan to the verge of an unprecedented civilian-led transition of power — or equally unprecedented back-to-back electoral victories. Along the way he has willingly ceded presidential powers, devolved power to the provinces, injected phenomenal amounts of national revenues into the provinces, attempted to bring tribal areas and Gilgit Baltistan into the national mainstream and presided over an economy that has eked out growth in a difficult international climate.

To his detractors, Zardari has presided over an epically corrupt and incompetent government that has recklessly endangered macroeconomic stability, allowed public sector enterprises to collapse under massive debt and mismanagement, failed to address perhaps the most severe bottleneck in the economy – a power sector in ruin – and done nothing to arrest the overall decline of the state and its ability to protect its population from an array of security threats.

So who is the real Zardari: The canny political operator who has helped strengthen the democratic order enough to at least ensure its continuity beyond his rule or a thoroughly compromised figure who epitomises an era of weak leadership amidst staggering challenges for state and society?

In truth, neither. Zardari has demonstrated no real vision to speak of, does not even appear to aspire to statesmanship, but he does have a finely-tuned instinct for survival. Because no one, perhaps not even Zardari, could have known just how suited he is for the politics of survival; the longevity of the government he has led by virtue of the fact that he is the boss of the PPP has given him an aura of success.

Thought to be destined for quick and ignominious failure when he took office, but then guiding himself and his government to survive six months, then a year, then two years, then three and four, and now nearly five full years, Zardari is latterly cast as a genius — of a gritty kind, just what the democratic project needed at this juncture, or of a scheming kind, who puts self-interest ahead of everything else.

But Zardari is neither a failure who got lucky or a genius who has been held back by circumstances. He is, simply, an arch survivor, and everything he has achieved or failed at is a by-product of that focus on survival — both the gains to democracy and the minuses in leadership, governance and statesmanship.

President Asif Ali Zardari with his main political rival, PMLN chief Nawaz Sharif, in 2008

Injudicious calculations

As president, there are any number of relations with other institutions and individuals that can shed some light on Zardari’s approach towards power, both as a means and as an end: civil-military relations, dealing with fractious coalition partners, handling a powerful opposition led by Nawaz Sharif, addressing the demands of an international power that eased his party’s way back to power. But because it has been played out overwhelmingly in public, the relationship with the superior judiciary led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhry is perhaps the easiest locale to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Zardari era.

Tellingly, the original mistake – having to contend with a powerful Chief Justice Chaudhry at all – was a by-product of a failed political strategy elsewhere. A year after the general election of February 2008, Chief Justice Chaudhry’s crusade to get himself restored appeared to be going nowhere. Because of his forceful personality and the role he played in the downfall of Musharraf, the chief justice was still on the national radar, and a national star — but his route back to power appeared blocked. Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar had steered the court out of the Musharraf emergency and the country had moved on, seemingly focused on making the transition to democracy work.

Crucially, Chief Justice Chaudhry had no real allies left in the political class. As WikiLeaks revealed, even Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PMLN) was wary of the deposed chief justice and willing to cut a deal with Zardari. “Shahbaz [Sharif] stated that following the restoration, the PMLN was prepared to end the issue and remove Chaudhry once and for all. On the issue of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Shahbaz claimed that the PMLN was open to negotiation, provided that Chaudhry was symbolically restored,” a US diplomatic cable from March 2009 revealed.

Zardari’s mistake? Trying to grab the Punjab government with the help of Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid-e-Azam (PMLQ) after imposing governor’s rule in the province. It was a classic case of overreach and homework not done: PMLQ had its feet in many camps, the army, the PMLN and the PPP. When the moment of truth arrived – would the bulk of PMLQ’s members in the Punjab Assembly fall in line behind the PPP to become coalition partners in the province? – the Zardari gamble failed. He had pushed the PMLN towards supporting the full restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry.

Therein lies a fundamental contradiction: If Zardari has been successful in fending off the superior judiciary led by the Chief Justice since March 2009, that success has only been necessitated because of a monumental error at the outset — allowing Justice Chaudhry to return as a powerful figure, instead of trying to cut a deal with the PMLN while it was within the realm of possibility.

Sparring with the judiciary

When confronted by situation X, Zardari’s ability to survive a threatening environment and emerge with his personal position and his government largely intact has imbued him with the image of a master tactician. But look beyond the immediate and, while Zardari does make the most of circumstances, those adverse circumstances are often of his own creation, at least in part.

Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf has survived a conviction for contempt of court in the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) case, but at the root of the NRO fiasco was the government’s insistence to long treat the case in the Supreme Court as a political matter to be fought in the court of public opinion, instead of as a legal matter in which legal manoeuvring could buy time at a lower cost. Curiously, just when the government appeared set to reap political dividends from its strategy of politicising the Supreme Court’s dogged pursuit of President Zardari through the NRO and Swiss cases, Zardari pulled the plug on his own political strategy and ordered the letter to Switzerland be dispatched.

After the exposure of Arsalan Iftikhar’s corrupt dealings with a close Zardari ally, Malik Riaz, and the Supreme Court’s adamant pursuit of a second prime minister, the court was losing the public and political battle. Even the most ardent defenders of the court had begun to question whether the letter to Switzerland was worth the price if it meant deep political and institutional instability in the country.

And just when the court’s standing was at its lowest ebb since March 2009, Zardari did an about-face and handed the court a face-saving exit. Gone, in an instant, was the political advantage that for long, during the cringe-inducing period of Babar Awan as law minister, had never looked to materialise.

Prime Minister Ashraf survives — but even that success is laced with fresh uncertainty because of the court’s renewed interest in the rental power scam. Its latest intervention was predictable enough when Ashraf was nominated as prime minister, itself in circumstances where the preferred candidate, Makhdoom Shahabuddin, was ambushed by judicial intervention at the last minute.

So, in heading off one crisis, Zardari’s chosen path has often, inadvertently perhaps, though predictably, laid the ground for the next crisis. To be sure, surviving five years in such a hostile environment is no small feat. But locked in a cause-and-effect cycle, the master tactician can also come across as a poor strategist.

When confronted by situation X, Zardari’s ability to survive a threatening environment and emerge with his personal position and his government largely intact has imbued him with the image of a master tactician. But look beyond the immediate and, while Zardari does make the most of circumstances, those adverse circumstances are often of his own creation, at least in part.

Legacy time

Now, on the verge of completing a five-year term in office and presiding over an unprecedented civilian-led electoral cycle, Zardari stands on the verge of his greatest victory, or his comeuppance. A divided Punjabi establishment – Nawaz Sharif on one side, the army on the other – and an increasingly regionalised electorate suggest the days of a ‘heavy mandate’ have passed. In a crowded electoral field, the margins between victory and defeat are narrower than ever. And astride this new electoral Pakistan stands Zardari — the master tactician using every trick in the book and then some to drag an unwieldy coalition across the finish line first.

In its dealings with the court, the Zardari-led PPP has gained little electoral advantage. The party base may be convinced that a partisan court has unfairly hounded a duly elected government but the burdens of incumbency hang heavy. Can a voter genuinely believe that the PPP’s performance in office could have been better had it not been for its troubles with the superior judiciary?

The question itself may be unfair, though: few governments anywhere in the world are judged on the basis of their relationship with other state institutions come election time. The judiciary is not meant to be an electoral consideration — and unless the court elects to insert itself into the polling or government-formation process via the liberal use of suo motu powers, it is unlikely to be a factor in whether the PPP gets another term from voters or not.

More worrying for Zardari is that few, if anyone, outside his inner circle believe that the PPP can win re-election through the politics of patronage and accumulating electables alone. Just as obviously, however, Zardari and his inner circle continue to exude confidence, believing that what has worked for five years can work for another five.

This much is clear, though: Never before has the PPP attempted to win an election without the inspiration of a charismatic leader and a populist message. If the electorate does deliver Zardari and his PPP a mandate for another five years, it may also finally bring down the curtain on the politics of ideology and hope.