Dick Cheney, the then vice president of the US, surrounded by senior staff members in Washington in the hours following the September 11, 2001 attacks | Reuters Ali: And part of that emotional management happens through euphemism and language. When James Clapper (Director of National Intelligence) was cross-questioned about replying “no” to the Senate on whether the NSA collects records on Americans, he said: “I responded in what I thought was the most truthful, or least untruthful manner, by saying no,” What’s happening there?
Masco: I don’t think public statements from national security officials can actually be understood anymore. In so many key moments, we’ve seen words mean their exact opposite in official practice. If everything concerning security is on a “need to know basis”, citizens never need to know and under the counter-terror logics of preemption are also cast as potential future terrorists. Clapper’s statement was helpful because he finally said it out loud and revealed the structures in which deception and misdirection have been basic tactics of official language for those formally committed to securing the lives of citizens.
Ali: Secrecy changes the citizen-state relationship completely, as you’ve argued, but what does it mean when the scale of the secrets between them is that the unclassified archive is about 10x the open literature?
Masco: This is Peter Galison’s estimate about the amount of classified material. The case made for government secrecy is that it protects information that would be dangerous to American citizens and the system itself, if it got out. The root of this logic is “the nuclear secret”.
In the 1990s, there was a short-lived moment of openness within the US government. There was an expectation that the democratic promise of the internet combined with the end of the Cold War constituted a new opportunity for an open government. But some of the very first actions of the Bush Administration in September 2001 involved reclassifying the archives and issuing guidelines throughout government that openness requests should be resisted. The U.S. now has 4 to 5 million people with security clearances, and you only have access to a kind of knowledge if you’re involved in the production of that project in some way.
I make the argument in the book that the civil defense program of the first decades of the Cold War was not aimed at protecting populations from physical attack. It was rather a means of teaching citizens to fear the bomb in a specific way and thereby a mechanism to militarize them as Cold War subjects.
Ali: And it creates a kind of terror in public life. In the book you have a 1953 federally issued pamphlet on how to be a “panic stopper” when gripped by nuclear fear which teaches citizens to act “like trained soldiers under fire.”
Masco: Yes, that pamphlet was part of a formal effort by a new federal civil defense agency to militarize citizens though nuclear danger. The crucial line in this campaign was between fear and terror. Fear was constituted by officials as a productive emotion but, in opposition to today, terror was considered a paralyzing experience, one that would be particularly dangerous in a democracy.
Post 9/11, the state was no longer worried about this calibration but focused on a maximal proliferation of things to worry about at every level of American society. Every aspect of public life, the entire infrastructure of the country – the electrical grid, train tracks, every post office, every national monument – were considered objects of counter-terror concern. It’s an extraordinary list of things to try to secure against every imaginable form of attack.