Born in February 1945 in the upper Tanawal area of Mansehra district, Muneeb-ur-Rehman has an elephantine memory | Arif Mahmood, White Star
On a quiet but sweltering Sunday morning in June, he occupies a steel and rexine chair in his two-room office at his madrasa — Darul Uloom Naeemia, set up by him and his associate Mufti Shujaat Ali Qadri back in 1973, not far from Muttahida Quami Movement’s central office, Nine Zero, in Karachi’s district central. The madrasa is closed for Ramzan break and none of its more than 500 students are around — its vast courtyard wears a deserted look.
Arranged like a library of religious books, adorned only with functional furnishing, his office is a reflection of his spartan, and academic, lifestyle. Always dressed in white, with a black waistcoat, he spends most of his time reading, writing and teaching. His only child, a son, also worked with him at the madrasa before he died of cancer in 2013 at the age of 38. Muneeb-ur-Rehman lives with his wife, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren in his house in Gulistan-e-Jauhar and does not talk much about his personal and family life beyond brief, rather evasive remarks. “It’s like what you see in most households,” he says when asked about his relationship with his family.
He shows little restraint as soon as controversies over moon sighting are mentioned, though. In a long and angry monologue, he asks why and how it is possible that one individual – Popalzai – is allowed to ridicule the state’s writ (read: the writ of the official moon sighting committee that Muneeb-ur-Rehman heads) every year. “It is the state’s responsibility to create systemic checks and balances to ensure that the official committee’s decision is considered final and binding.”
Controversies over moon sighting have plagued Muslim history since the very beginning. Al Majmu, a treatise written by the 13th century Arab scholar Muhyi ad-Din Yahya al-Nawawi, shows the founders of various Islamic schools of jurisprudence, including Imam Shafi and Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, respectively from the eighth and ninth centuries, to have expressed different opinions on the issue. Shafi put his entire trust in arithmetic and astronomical calculations; Hanbal deemed the physical sighting of the moon mandatory, although he did not see local sighting as necessary — once the moon is sighted anywhere in the Muslim world, every follower of the faith must accept that. Ibn-e-Taymiyya, another 13th century scholar, writing in his Risala fi’l-Hilal (Tract on the Crescent), “...categorically rejects the use of astronomical calculation in determining the lunar month.” Yaqut ibn Abdullah al-Hamawi, a 12th century Arab biographer and geographer of Greek origin, gives the government complete authority in making such decisions. He cites a legal maxim: “Hukm al-hakim ilzamun wa yarfa’ al-khilaf” (decision by a ruler is decisive and erases differences). In the 1920s, the grand mufti at Jamia al-Azhar in Cairo, Shaykh Mustafa Maraghi wrote in a paper that personal testimony of moon sighting cannot be accepted if scientific calculations conclusively prove that a moon sighting was not possible.
Between the early Muslims and their current religious descendants, multiple texts have been written and debated on the issue, each more informed than the previous one due to gradual improvements in the astronomical sciences as well as the increased reliance on technology to observe celestial objects with better accuracy. Yet controversies have proliferated at the same speed as interpretations of earlier religious texts have become sophisticated and complex.
The first official institution to decide on the sighting of the moon in Pakistan was formed in 1948; an executive order set up a central committee which would receive reports from districts committees from all the regions, including its now separated eastern part. The meteorological department, too, was consulted before a decision on moon sighting was made.
By that rule, Muneeb-ur-Rehman’s tenure at the committee should have ended a decade and a half ago.
In 1958, this mechanism faced its first reported shock as Peshawar celebrated Eidul Fitr a day before the rest of the country. This was the first of many controversies to come, created by regional, and sometimes political, differences over moon sighting. In the 1960s, Karachi differed with the central government’s decisions on the sighting of the moon three times in seven years.
On March 17, 1961, the official mechanism all but self-destructed. Ayub Khan’s military government made an announcement about Eidul Fitr and then, in a late night development, changed its announcement without consulting the committee and its chairman, Ehteshamul Haq Thanvi, a respected cleric from Karachi. The residents of the port city were already chafed by the government’s decision to shift the federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad and saw the shifting of Eid day as another political snub. As a result, most parts of Karachi observed a fast on March 18 while most of the rest of the country – except, of course, Peshawar – observed Eid that day. Peshawar had already marked Eid on March 17, following a Saudi announcement. Pakistan thus had three Eids that year.
A few years later, the problem cropped up again. Both in 1966 and 1967, Ayub Khan’s government changed its earlier moon sighting announcements, again late in the night. In the latter year, the final official declaration that the Eid moon had been sighted appeared particularly galling since the weather that day had made it impossible to see the moon. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a Karachi-based party which was campaigning at the time for the removal of Ayub Khan’s decade-long authoritarian rule, vehemently opposed the official decision. Most residents of Karachi sided with JI and did not observe Eid on the government-designated day.