Paramilitary forces raided the headquarters of Muttahida Quami Movement in April 2015 | Reuters
If we take Karachi as an example, we have military and paramilitary forces maintaining law and order in the city since 1989. Do we see any improvement in the situation? The same is the case with military courts which have been used before — and not just once. Are we deluding ourselves into believing that this time round they will correct the system? The irony is that military courts are not coming about due to a military takeover of power, but have been approved and set up by an elected parliament and a civilian government.
This, though, is not the first time that a civilian government is deploying military courts. It was under a civilian government in 1953 that the first military courts were set up in Pakistan in the wake of anti-Ahmedi violence. The most famous punishments meted out by those military courts were death sentences to two religious leaders — Abdus Sattar Niazi of Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and Abul Aala Maudoodi of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).
The argument many people make in favour of the military’s involvement in policing and judicial affairs is that these cannot be effectively handled without enforcing the writ of the state through the strongest of measures, even when those measures infringe the citizens’ fundamental human rights. Their point of view goes like this: terrorism is gaining momentum, and in order to curb it, the government requires steps that prioritise restoration of peace over anything else.
I’ll start by asking Salahuddin Ahmed to explain the main questions that arise from the involvement of military and paramilitary forces in maintaining law and order and dispensing justice.
Salahuddin Ahmed. The very imposition of martial laws has been endorsed by civilians, and civilian governments have set up military courts with the same enthusiasm as martial law governments have. The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up military courts in 1977 to hear cases of those agitating from the platform of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The Sindh High Court, however, ruled the military courts did not enjoy legitimacy as a judicial forum. In spite of that ruling, these courts were back again as soon as Ziaul Haq imposed military rule. When the setting up of these courts was challenged again, the Balochistan High Court struck them down. The court said the doctrine of necessity might have justified the martial law, but nothing should allow a parallel judicial system to come into existence. In light of this verdict, the Zia regime had to concede some ground to the superior judiciary, including the power to hear appeals against military court verdicts. These concessions were part of a negotiated transaction between the courts and military government.
Then in 1998, Nawaz Sharif’s government promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). Once military courts were set up under this law, the Supreme Court ruled against them on the basis that the Constitution has no room for an alternate judiciary. Sensing that the case law has always rejected military courts, this time the government has provided additional protection to them by introducing the 21st Amendment in the Constitution. The parliamentary approval of the amendment is aimed at saving the military courts from a judicial knockout.
Whether our Constitution has a fundamental structure is the other issue the amendment gives rise to. All kinds of interesting legal questions stem from this. If there is a fundamental structure to the Constitution, then does it permit military courts? Should superior courts interfere with the unanimous passage of the amendment by Parliament? Should courts limit Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution?
There is also a popular saying, “Let forms of government fools contest, who governs best is best.” That kind of pragmatic approach also exists in the country. As a society, therefore, we shall have to decide if judicial work falls within the ambit of the military’s responsibilities. Or should we follow the constitutional and sociopolitical theories of governance which say it is not the military’s responsibility to perform judicial and policing functions?
Khan. If we look at the judiciary’s decisions right from 1953, the judges have always endorsed not just military courts but also military dictatorships. So, why do you think the judiciary will now behave differently?
Ahmed. Our courts have almost always considered themselves to be subservient to the military. Judicial decisions against military rule surface only after a dictator has left. All the decisions against Pervez Musharraf’s rule are coming out after he is no longer in power. The decision in the Asma Jillani case against Yahya Khan’s military government, too, came after Yahya’s rule had already ended.
Individual judges, however, have tried to introduce measures against the encroachment of civilian turf by the military. For example, in the Nusrat Bhutto case, Zia’s takeover was condoned, but after that the high courts said the military regime could not try civilians in military courts. Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry’s decision on a petition by the Sindh High Court Bar Association against the imposition of emergency rule by Pervez Musharraf in 2007 became possible only because there was public resentment over prolonged military rule. But when the superior judiciary sees the army, civilian institutions and a majority of the media on the same page, then at the end of the day, they are just 17 old men.