Historian K.K. Aziz
In fact, Aziz, citing literature from as early as 1858, has stated that there were several reasons, not least of which was the limited geographical spread of the revolt, which could be used to conclusively argue that the character of 1857 war was not nationalistic. Therefore, one of the problems with using textbook material as the sole source for The History Project is that it misses historiographical nuances that could have produced a version of history which broadened students’ understanding of the subject beyond simply the provision of two different perspectives.
The second problem overlaps with the first, in that it is related to the way in which the book is divided into “Indo” and “Pak” sections without a third section that would offers insight – or some critical reflection – into why these perspectives are different. The structure, as it is, provides a very engaging read for those who are already familiar with the subject matter as it lists the myths that are propagated on both sides of the border. Its presentation, however, is problematic because it throws up these myths as fact and, therefore, will still be a questionable main text to give to high school students.
One of the aims of The History Project, as stated in its concept note, is to “highlight the reality of an alternative perspective with equally convincing foundations,” but that alternative perspective is missing from the book. Instead, in an attempt to build bridges between the opposing views of history held by the rival countries, this uncritical presentation ends up reproducing two versions of history, both based on flawed foundations.
One of the most obvious manifestations of this is how, throughout the book, the category of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ is used to signify monolithic identities that bisected undivided India. For instance, in the section on the movement against the partition of Bengal, the Indo section produces a narrative of Hindu-Muslim unity where followers of both faiths protested together “and marched barefoot to the Ganges”. This version is juxtaposed with the Pak section that states that the “Muslims … were delighted” but the Hindus disliked this partition of Bengal and so started “a violent agitation” against it. Similarly, when describing the Khilafat Movement, the book uses ‘Congress’ and ‘Hindu’ interchangeably. The problem here is not just in the narrative itself but in dealing with Hindus and Muslims as two groups who can be cleanly divided, and who are seen as existing unchanged throughout the period being studied.
To present South Asian history in this manner is to deny the large amount of scholarship that has highlighted the fractured, temporally contingent and regionally specific multiple identities that have existed under the umbrella category of a communal identity such as ‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’. To name just a few, Ayesha Jalal’s Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850 has highlighted the variegated experiences and expressions of Muslim identity at the same time that her other work, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, discussed how the political identity of Muslims was different depending on whether they were a minority or a majority constituent of a province. A similar point has been made by Francis Robinson, who wrote on the experiences of Muslims in what was then the United Provinces, to show that it was there, where Muslims were a minority and not in Punjab and Bengal – where Muslims were in a majority – that Muslim separatism was expressed earlier and more vocally.