Tag Archives: quetta

Vote versus veto

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Vote-detailed-1

Scores of women, wrapped in big chadors and holding photos of young men, shout at the top of their voices in the main bazaar of Balochistan’s Turbat city on a hot March afternoon. They want Baloch nationalist parties to boycott the upcoming general election, and instead support the separatists waging a bloody war against security forces. The women include mothers, sisters and wives of the young Baloch men who have either been found dead or have gone missing over the last few years.

Besides public agitation, separatist militants sometimes also use violent means to stop the nationalist parties from taking part in the polls. Similarly, security forces and intelligence agencies want to restrict the activities of the nationalist parties. When it comes to dealing with Baloch nationalist parties, both the intelligence and security apparatuses and the separatists appear to be on the same wavelength, although for different reasons, a political analyst tells the Herald in Turbat. Both want the nationalists to stay away from the election, he says without wanting to be named due to security reasons.

The separatists, according to him, interpret the participation of the nationalist parties in the election as a means to strengthen Islamabad’s writ over Balochistan. This, he says, also weakens the case the separatists are trying to make before the international community; that the Baloch people want Balochistan’s secession from Pakistan. The separatists know well that once the popular Baloch nationalist parties reach the parliament and manage to either form or became a part of the provincial government, armed struggle for Balochistan’s independence will lose sympathies and dissipate with the passage of time, he explains.

On the other hand, the analyst says, the election of popular Baloch nationalist parties into power will weaken the security forces’ grip over the affairs of the province. He claims that security and intelligence agencies prefer working with non-nationalist Baloch politicians who, like ministers in the outgoing provincial cabinet, connive with security forces in perpetuating the status quo — in return, benefitting from the illegal trade of petroleum and other goods from and to Afghanistan and Iran. These ministers, he says, have never raised their voices against the killing and kidnapping of young Baloch men or of political activists. The security and intelligence agencies want to maintain this situation as it exists now even after the election and this could be possible only if parties such as the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNPM) and the National Party (NP) either boycott the polls or are not allowed to carry out proper electioneering, the analyst adds.

These two parties indeed have paid a high price for sticking to electoral, democratic politics in the face of twin threats: The scores of party workers and leaders killed in the last few years and the steadily shrinking political space for the middle class from Makran, Kalat and Quetta divisions in the largely tribal and feudal society of Balochistan.

In the province, the situation on the ground is hardly helpful for these parties. Major cities in the Makran division are chock-a-bloc with graffiti appealing the masses not to cast their vote and threatening candidates that they could be killed for taking part in the poll process. A huge swathe of south-western Balochistan, comprising 14 predominantly Baloch districts of the province, don’t even get television coverage of the polling exercise going on elsewhere in the country. A cable operator in Gwadar city, who does not want to make his identity public due to security concerns, tells the Herald how, in early March, separatists sent written messages to all cable operators in the area instructing them to stop relaying Pakistani news channels. Some who ignored the directive saw their houses attacked, he says.

Sardar Akhtar Mengal, the cheif of the Balochistan National Party - Mengal, faces pressure from Baloch separatists to boycott the 2013 election

Sardar Akhtar Mengal, the cheif of the Balochistan National Party – Mengal, faces pressure from Baloch separatists to boycott the 2013 election

A week after the operators had blocked Pakistani news channels, the members of a hitherto unknown group, Gwadar Youth Force, approached them and demanded that they also block all Indian entertainment channels and stop airing Indian films on cable networks. Again, those who did not heed the demands of the group faced attacks on their houses, the cable operator says. Everyone knows that the security and intelligence agencies are behind organisations such as Gwadar Youth Force, he adds. In some areas, journalists associated with television channels, and even those working for local and national newspapers, have been told both by security agencies and separatists not to report negatively about their activities. Many news correspondents in Makran, who until recently would happily discuss the political and security situation in Balochistan with visiting reporters from Karachi or Islamabad, now avoid even seeing reporters.

Yet, the Baloch nationalist parties are determined to contest the upcoming election, unlike in 2008, when they decided to sit out the election process in protest of the military operation being carried out in parts of Balochistan. On March 26, two days after returning from self-exile in Dubai, Akhtar Mengal, the BNPM president, headed a long meeting of his party’s main leadership in Karachi. Mengal told the media, after the meeting, that his party had decided to contest the coming polls. He said BNPM will use the election as a means to highlight “apprehensions about the rights of the Baloch people”.

Ghafoor Baloch, a senior nationalist leader, says that nationalist parties have held lenghty sessions to weigh the pros and cons of both participating in the election and boycotting it. During these discussions, he says, the parties analysed threats from militants who call themselves the “Sarmachars” – a Balochi word for freedom fighters – and who have particularly targeted Makran division and its nearby districts of Khuzdar and Awaran. The participants of these meetings have also discussed why violence against political activities and security forces is low in districts where the sardari or tribal system is very strong. According to him, both separatist militants and the security forces are targeting political workers of left-leaning, liberal political forces. Other political parties have also announced that they are contesting in the election and running their election campaigns but their workers are neither being targeted by militants nor by security and intelligence apparatuses, Baloch claims. In such a situation, he says, poll boycott is a relatively easy and safe option for the nationalist parties. But he raises a question: “Will poll participation make the situation worse for liberal Baloch nationalist parties than what they have faced during the last five years?” If the answer is no, he says, then why not contest the election and at least make an effort to change the situation without bothering much about the results and the future?”

A senior BNPM leader confirms this when he tells the Herald that his party has decided to participate in the election despite having reservations about the establishment’s meddling in the political affairs of the province, as well as opposition from Baloch militant groups. The leaders of both BNPM and NP also say that they are holding talks with each other as well as with other political parties for possible election alliances and seat adjustment. But they also point out that fear of violence is holding them back from launching their mass contact activities in the run-up to the election to convince the electorate that parliamentary democracy is the best way to promote the Baloch cause.

Muhammad Yousuf, a senior journalist and the president of Gwadar Press Club, believes that threats of violence will force electioneering in the province to remain a low key affair, keeping public participation and voter turnout poor. In urban areas, he says, candidates may bring the voters out but it will be extremely difficult in rural areas where distance between the villages and polling stations is normally 20 to 30 kilometres. In the presence of the clear and imminent danger of militant attacks, there is little chance that voters will be willing to risk their lives to reach polling stations, covering such long distances. This, Yousuf says, may leave a serious question mark over the legitimacy of the next election which will then be seen as unreflective of the will of the people.

Away from Baloch nationalist hub in Makran division, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), is all set to launch its election campaign, in contrast to its decision in 2008 to boycott the polls. Based in the north of Balochistan and popular among the mainly Pashtun residents of the province, the party is wasting no time in debating the costs and benefits of its decision against participation in the previous election and is, instead, focusing its energies on the coming election, says its provincial president, Usman Kakar. Expecting that the Baloch nationalist parties will also participate fully in the May election, he says: “We are looking forward to making seat adjustments with liberal and progressive forces in both provincial and national elections.” Without naming any parties or groups that PkMAP would like to ally itself with before or after the election, Kakar says that during the formation of the next government his party will prefer joining hands with progressive and liberal forces “instead of those who support the armed forces’ role in politics in one way or the other”.

Live discussion on Pakistan’s military doctrine – 2

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Is the shift in Pakistan’s military doctrine a case of too little, too late?

For the last 66 years, India has been Pakistan’s enemy number one — but this now seems to be changing, with military leaders and policy makers suggesting that internal security threats such as religious and ethnic militancy and the worsening law and order are posing a greater challenge to the country. Even the Green Book, which sets out the Pakistan’s Army’s strategic doctrine, has – for the first time – included a chapter titled “sub-conventional warfare” in its latest edition. On January 18, at 8:30 pm, the Herald has invited two panelists to discuss the consequences of this ostensible change in doctrine.

Ayesha-detailed

Political commentator Ayesha Siddiqa has written extensively on the military and related subjects.

haqqani-detailed

The former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, Husain Haqqani, has authored a book titled Pakistan: Between mosque and military. He is currently a director at the Hudson Institute, Washington.

You can join the discussion or post your questions beforehand in the comments section below.

 

Sect in stone

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It is important to speak of sectarian conflicts – rather than one sectarian conflict – when looking at the complex phenomenon of sectarianism in Pakistan. Sectarian violence, as well as sectarian conflicts, in the country exists in a complex web of interrelated and mutually reinforcing forms of violence and militancy, often making it difficult to separate these intertwined factors.

Keeping the complex contexts and interrelated forms of violence in mind, any analysis of sectarian violence should carefully avoid monocausal explanations. Sectarian violence, indeed, consists of several levels: criminal activities, competition between sectarian groups and violence to put pressure on political and law enforcement bodies, for example, are all now part of this enterprise.

Another mistake would be to see sectarian violence as being targeted against just one side of the divide. Despite the obvious asymmetry – the vast majority of those being killed are Shias – it is important to note that Sunnis are also being targeted. There is a steady stream of target killings, particularly against Sunni activists in Karachi, which is sometimes lost amidst news about striking acts of violence against Shias.

The recent growth in sectarian violence is better explained by the reinforcement of elements and factors which have enabled and supported sectarianism and sectarian violence in the past. Violent sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi extended their network outside their traditional strongholds in south Punjab long before the recent surge in violence, and their connections with other militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban are also not established recently. This is reflected in the gradual change in the focus of violence which has moved away from Punjab, the hub of such violence particularly in 1990s, to locations such as Quetta and Gilgit which, though not new venues of sectarian conflicts, are where the most striking violent incidents have taken place recently.

Sectarian violence has increased because of a clear expansion of operational spaces for violent sectarian groups to function within. Methods used in the recent sectarian violence incidents show that the groups operate with confidence and without fear of being caught. Targeting Shias on buses and other passenger vehicles, although not a new method, has become the favoured modus operandi of militant sectarian groups. Taking time to drag passengers out of the targeted vehicles, identifying Shias and shooting them differs significantly from targeted killings conducted swiftly by usually two gunmen on motorcycles from a safe distance, with the possibility of disappearing as soon as the shooting is over. Such ease of operations could have ensued from the fact that the police and the courts don’t have the capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict sectarian killers.

The groups perpetrating violence can also rely on the fact that before the upcoming general election next year no serious action will be taken against them. Instead, political parties are engaging with several sectarian leaders and reaching out to all possible constituencies for political support. The symbols of banned groups are openly displayed in political rallies, and party leaders are arguing over what actually constitutes the fine line between talking to and engaging with the leaders of the banned groups. Thus, as has become customary, the actions by the government and political parties are confined to ritual condemnations of sectarian killings and referring to international intelligence agencies and ‘foreign hands’ as being behind them. Sectarian violence would not be possible without such a permissive and enabling environment.

This increase in violence is also coupled with the strengthening of exclusivist sectarian discourse which exists and thrives in an environment where the governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer was assassinated in 2011 by his bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri who believed Taseer had committed blasphemy. The reaction to the killing was highly polarised in Pakistan: on the one hand there was strong condemnation of the brutal-violent act, on the other hand it was celebrated, with rose petals showered on Qadri after the incident.

Sectarian discourse flourishes in an environment where an unknown malang (vagabond) was killed this July in Bahawalpur by a group of people unrelated to any militant group after they accused him of insulting the sanctity of the Quran. This discourse is not removed from but inherently linked to the idea of defending religion (as defined by the perpetrators of violence) and acting against the elements threatening the sanctity of what is considered true Islam. Who is considered a blasphemer in a particular case may vary, but the logic in these incidents is the same. It allows the use of instant justice by self-appointed judges and executioners against those who profess different interpretations of Islam or against those who are seen to threaten a particular interpretation of the religion. It is impossible to draw the line to separate these cases, permitting and justifying one without implicitly allowing others. Sectarian discourse – with sectarian violence – is thus an integral part of – as well as forcing – the ongoing debate of who is ‘really’ a Muslim and what their status is in Pakistani society.

The increase in sectarian violence perhaps has had the inadvertent effect of sectarianism being discussed and thought of in the context of ‘securing minorities’ in Pakistan. It is true that Shias make up perhaps 15 per cent of the Pakistani population (the exact percentage is unknown and debated) but the concept of ‘minority’ in this case is essentially different to ‘what is less in numbers’. In fact, Shias in Pakistan have fought against Sunni demands of labelling them as a (religious) minority, this is understandable in a country whose national identity is centred on religious majoritarianism.

Branding a community particularly as a religious minority in Pakistan carries with it the processes of exclusion from the Muslim majority, legal consequences, institutional segregation as well as stigma and marginalisation. The categorisation of Shias as a (religious) minority, often heard both in national and international media, can be seen as a step towards change in the perception of Shia communities and as a success of the sectarian exclusivist discourse.

Sectarian violence has also produced demands to protect the Shia communities. It is impossible, of course, to secure entire communities but the security measures recently announced because of the recent violent incidents (such as the extra funds reportedly allocated for the security of the Karakoram Highway, or the police and the Frontier Corps escorts for buses in Quetta) are nevertheless showing that some concrete measures are being taken to improve the situation, however limited their factual effect would be.

These new security measures, though, should be looked at in the context of those already in place. It is astounding to realise that providing security for the Muharram processions and gatherings is the largest annual police operation in Pakistan, requiring substantial amounts of resources every year. Incidents of sectarian violence through the years have resulted in systematising and institutionalising the practice of securing certain religious places and practices and most worryingly this is now normalised in the Pakistani society. It highlights the damaging effect of sectarian discourse enforced with protracted violence and underscores how public spaces are increasingly used for contesting and limiting religious plurality of Pakistani society. Rather than eliminating Shias, sectarian violence has managed to limit the public space for them to practice their religion and function as a community. This must seem like a success for those who perpetrate sectarian violence, encouraging that violence to continue.

With political will to limit the operational spaces for violent sectarian groups to function, it is possible to change the trend of increasing sectarian violence. But it needs a parallel change in appreciating and valuing religious plurality in Pakistan, both at the national and local levels, and particularly in public spaces. This would make the exclusivist sectarian discourse much harder to find resonance and survive in the Pakistani society. n

— Katja Riikonen is a PhD candidate and an associate in Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) at the University of Bradford, UK. Her PhD research focuses on sectarian violence in Pakistan

Dialogue of the deaf

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Let us move towards some solutions, says Quetta-based historian and writer Dr Shah Muhammad Marri, pointing out that there has already been enough storytelling on Balochistan’s bloodshed. The question now is where to look for a solution. One thing that everyone keeps highlighting as key to finding a solution is the need to bring Baloch separatists back to the negotiating table. How easy or difficult will that be — given that, over the last few years, 400 mutilated bodies of mainly Baloch young men have been retrieved from different parts of the province following their disappearance from their hometowns? Is it possible for separatists to see any meaning in offers for negotiations while young Baloch men continue to disappear after mysterious encounters with security and intelligence agencies?

And then there is history. That may be one reason why the military establishment continues to treat Balochistan the way it does and always has, says Marri. Balochistan’s inclusion in Pakistan, despite the fact that the Kalat state assembly had voted against accession, set the tone for the future — even in the initial years after Independence, there was an anti-state armed rebellion in the province. Since then there has been a feeling within the establishment that Balochistan did not join Pakistan by choice; there has been a constant fear that the province would secede from Pakistan if and when it could, says Marri. This fear has compelled the military to adopt a perpetually repressive policy towards Balochistan, he adds.

Everything around here is mine

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Map of Balochistan

Source: Small & Medium Enterprise Development Association

It’s official: nearly 80 per cent of all minerals produced in Pakistan come from Balochistan, according to the latest data compiled by the Geological Survey of Pakistan. What is less known is that the province’s mineral potential is much bigger than the current production statistics suggest. While this gap between the potential and actual production is generally blamed on the absence of security, insiders say successive governments have done nothing to build the technical capacity of the mining sector and political meddling has checked the development of mining as a possible engine of growth for the provincial economy.

Only 22 people, out of Balochistan Mines and Mineral Development Department’s total strength of 560, work with its directorate general for mines and minerals — the section that deals with the technical aspects of exploration and licensing. Requesting not to be named, a former director general of the department revealed that such capacity deficiency coupled with political interference is the most important factor in the minimal development of the mineral sector in the province. The myopic provincial political leaders see the sector merely as an avenue for employing their favourites and issuing mining leases to relatives and cronies, he alleges. The other short-sighted provincial policy is to keep mining royalties to the minimum, which is to the disadvantage of the provincial exchequer, he explains. “The department [which should have ensured] mining’s growth is [indeed] severely hampered by such political interference,” he says.

The former official’s disclosures cannot be dismissed as the raving and ranting of a possibly disgruntled retired bureaucrat. A review of the National Mineral Policy 2002, jointly done by the World Bank and the federal Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, confirms what he says. The review report discovered that the development of Pakistan’s mineral resources in 2003 was limited to quarries (open pits), producing only precious stones, limestone, rock salt gypsum and modest amount of coal, mostly from Balochistan. Since then, there has been hardly any change. For instance, the report pointed out thatPakistanexported gems worth 2.2 million US dollars in 2001; this registered a meagre increase of 1.4 US million dollars to reach 3.63 million US dollars in 2010. During the same period,India’s gem export earnings shot up from 4.9 billion US dollars in 2001 to a whopping 33.5 billion US dollars in 2010.

In what can be seen as evidences of inefficient work culture and overweening political interference, the workers of the Balochistan Mines and Mineral Development Department were waging daily protests in the second week of the last month against the appointment of a pharmacist and a primary teacher on technical posts that they were not qualified for. An inside source tells the Herald that political interference has crippled the department’s working. To quote an example of such interference, he alleges that successive ministers for mines and minerals have been interfering in the issuing of licences for prospecting, exploration and mining even when they do not have the authority to do so. The ministers do this, the source says, by blocking elevation of eligible senior officers as members of the department’s mines committee which, under the rules, is the sole authority to grant or refuse licences and leases.

One of these officers, Dr Saeed Baloch, has been eligible for promotion for the last six years to the post of the department’s director general, a position that will automatically make him the head of the mines committee. The other officer is Zarbat Khan who could have become a director of the department two years ago, and thereby a member of the committee, but has not. Taking advantage of the undefined rules to govern the working of the department, the ministers appoint their favourites but theoretically ineligible and junior officers to these posts and thereby influence the process of issuing licences and leases, the source adds.

Siddiq Raisani, the owner of several mining companies, goes a step further in blaming the politicians. It is not just the minister for mines and minerals who is involved in subverting the rules for issuing licences, he alleges, and adds that half of Balochistan’s cabinet is doing the same thing because many provincial ministers either have shares in mining companies or own them fully.

In Balochistan’s provincial capital Quetta, stories about ministers and senior government officials owning mining companies through their frontmen are rife even when it is almost impossible to find the paper trail linking a particular minister or official to a particular company. As of now, nearly 400 individuals and companies hold prospecting licenses for 32 minerals in the province and cabinet ministers and government functionaries have stakes in many of these companies through proxies, says the government source.

The provincial government officials that were willing to speak on the matter say there is no way to stop people from forming and running mining companies on the allegation that they enjoy political backing. The law does not bar even ministers and serving government officials from owning mining companies, they add.

But the Herald’s source in the mining department claims that the politically connected companies always get a better deal. “The ministers not only manage to get new prospecting licences and fresh mining leases for thousands of acres of lands [for the companies they support and sponsor], they also have their men sitting in the mines committee who transfer existing leases, without informing the original lease holders, to the [ministers’ favoured firms],” he says.

A December 2010 ruling of the Balochistan High Court verifies this. In 2007, Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) received a prospecting licence for iron ore for 2,006.12 acres of land in Pachin Koh, in Chagai district’s Nokundi area. Subsequently, the mines committee issued a mining lease to PPL that came into effect from January 2007 and was valid for the next 20 years. OnJune 7, 2010, the mines committee issued a show-cause notice to PPL, telling it that its lease area could be reduced because it had kept the site underutilised for a long time. Though the committee gave the PPL 30 days to file a reply, it allotted 929.75 acres of the land under the company’s lease to another firm, M/s Shahnawaz Pumice, before the expiry of that period. The PPL lodged an appeal against this before the secretary of the Mines and Minerals Development Department. When he did not take any decision, PPL filed a petition at the Balochistan High Court which set aside the orders of the mines committee and observed: “It was expected that [the secretary], with whom the petitioner (PPL) had filed the appeal along with a stay application, would have acted in this case of blatant violation of the rules … but instead [the secretary] virtually sat on the appeal.”

A source claims that it is only on paper that M/s Shahnawaz Pumice is owned by one Shahnawaz, a poor man from Chagai. He was made the owner of the company because the Balochistan Mineral Rules 2002 require that a company applying for and getting a prospecting licence in a district must have a local person as a shareholder. The firm is actually formed and run by one Shabbir Mengal who is publicly known in Quetta as a frontman for several ministers of the Balochistan cabinet, the source says.

In a clear acknowledgement of unwarranted interference in mining affairs, the World Bank review report recommended eliminating discretionary ministerial and official powers from the process of granting or refusing mining licences and leases. Instead, those powers appear to have become even stronger.

Another major consequence of the provincial ministers’ blatant involvement in mineral affairs is that Balochistan has registered hardly any increase in its royalty receipts from minerals over the last many years. Since most current cabinet members have also been a part of the provincial cabinets in successive previous governments, they are reported to have ensured that royalties remain low. For instance, in 2010, the provincial mines and mineral department suggested imposing a royalty of 170 rupees on every tonne of coal mined in the province but the provincial cabinet approved only 70 rupees a tonne as royalty, officials reveal.

Balochistan Chief Secretary Ahmed Bukhsh Lehri, however, denies that this is an issue. He says that until recently the provincial government was actually spending from its own kitty to encourage coal mining in Balochistan. “The coal miners were receiving subsidy rather than paying any royalty,” he explains. So, any money coming in as royalty, no matter how small, is an improvement.