Looking in all directions

Nawaz Sharif addresses Sindh National Front’s (SNF) workers at a rally in Ratodero

In early May 2012, Nawaz Sharif was addressing a public gathering in Ratodero, a town in Larkana district synonymous with the Bhuttos. His host, too, was a Bhutto — Mumtaz Ali, a two-time chief minister of Sindh and the founding leader of his Sindh National Front (SNF) which has campaigned for a confederal Pakistan since 1989 and that has now merged with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN). And for the first time in his political career, Sharif made the surprising admission that he was in love with a Bhutto. “Nawaz Sharif loves Mumtaz Bhutto for standing by his principles.”

Along with this declaration, he mentioned two more things which confound more than they explain the relationship between his PMLN and Bhutto’s SNF. “Mumtaz says he has merged his party with our party; I say PMLN has merged with his party.” This was soon followed by another pronouncement of similarly sweeping nature: “I am pleased to know that Mumtaz’s stance on giving more rights and power to the provinces is same as PMLN’s.”

Such broad brushstrokes serve the two sides rather well, each giving it the spin of its convenience. “It is a great political achievement of Nawaz Sharif that the supporters of the confederation have agreed to give up their slogan and merge themselves with his party which stands for the federation,” is how Senator Pervez Rasheed, a senior PMLN leader, explains it to the Herald.

“The PMLN has accepted the spirit of the confederation by agreeing to maximum provincial autonomy,” says Engineer Ayub Sher who served as the last general secretary of the SNF and is currently vice president of PMLN-Sindh chapter. “Sharif appears supportive of the confederative system proposed in the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore in 1940,” he says. He adds that the PMLN chief has agreed to the Sindhi nationalists’ demand that the Senate is made “stronger than the National Assembly because the upper house has equal representation from all the four provinces”.

Sharif’s acceptance of the demand to empower the Senate more than the National Assembly cannot be such a non-event that nobody outside a coterie of Mumtaz Bhutto aides knows about it. It has, in fact, happened in the imagination of people like Sher because it involves a massive power shift that Sharif can accept only if he is generous enough to forgo his politics in Punjab which will be the biggest loser, politically speaking, with an emaciated National Assembly. Rasheed vouches for that. “We are ready to work with, form an alliance with, and accept in our party the forces that accept the country’s constitution,” he says, clarifying that the PMLN is not agreeing to a big change in the existing constitutional scheme, let alone accepting a new confederal Constitution.

The language of the electoral agreement that the PMLN has struck with the Sindh United Party (SUP), led by Jalal Mehmood Shah, the grandson of the late Sindhi nationalist leader G M Syed, also avoids making radical promises. It calls for maximum provincial autonomy within the ambit of the Constitution, implementation of the water accord of 1991 in letter and spirit, protection of geographical boundaries of Sindh and giving the province the power to generate maximum financial resources on its own. None of these requires any constitutional restructuring. In fact, most of them are already guaranteed under different articles of the Constitution.

The PMLN’s recent track record, in fact, shows that it has little appetite for any restructuring of the existing federal system, no matter how symbolic. It is perhaps the only party in the current parliament which resisted the naming of North West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its parliamentarians have also resisted the devolution of such subjects as education from the centre to the provinces under the 18th Amendment.

If the PMLN cannot give the Sindhi nationalists what they have been demanding for decades, then why are the two sides coming closer to each other? For many, the reason is a straightforward one — 2013 elections. Sharif is certainly motivated by the desire to make inroads into Sindh’s politics, dominated by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the rural hinterland and by the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in the urban centres. “We want to free the people of Sindh from the shackles of the PPP and the MQM,” Rasheed announces grandly.

Jalal Mehmood Shah, president of the Sindh United Front, Nawaz Sharif and Mumtaz Bhutto, the chairman of SNF shake hands over their electoral alliance in the upcoming elections

Analysts, however, see the situation in a mundane political context. “Sharif is trying to woo Sindhi nationalists in order to enter the province’s politics,” says Sohail Warraich, a Lahore-based journalist and political analyst. But he cannot do so while he is seen by the voters in Sindh as Punjab’s leader. “That will meet severe resistance,” says Warraich.

The PMLN’s primary objective is to weaken the PPP’s hold on provincial politics and somehow “balance” the power of the MQM, he argues. “This is precisely why Sharif’s party has joined the nationalists’ chorus against the new local government law, dubbing it as an attempt to divide Sindh.” As if to prove Warraich right, Sharif has supported all the recent calls by Sindhi nationalists for protests, sit-ins and strikes over the law as a means to embarrass the PPP in its own powerbase and further alienate the MQM in rural Sindh.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, another Lahore-based political analyst, links these developments with the perception that the PPP is losing electoral ground in Sindh. “The PMLN is hoping to get a breakthrough in the province’s politics and build its support there [ahead of the upcoming elections] by forging alliances with anti-PPP forces,” he says.

Some Sindhi intellectuals see Sharif’s entry into Sindh’s politics as the possible starting point for the emergence of an alternative to the growing alliance between the PPP and the MQM. The intellectuals are happy that he is not taking the same route to the provincial politics which he did in the past via the MQM. Zulfiqar Halepoto, a Sindhi nationalist activist and a Hyderabad-based political analyst, praises him for shunning what he calls the “anti-Sindhi camp” of the MQM. “Sharif’s victory in the next election will certainly be to the advantage of Sindh,” he says.

The radical agenda that Halepoto wants Sharif to promote consists of maximum financial and political autonomy for the federating units and a rewriting of the Constitution to restructure the federation and redress the current imbalance against the smaller provinces. So far the PMLN has been careful in supporting such causes. Besides making pious noises against the local government law, it has avoided being categorical on other issues. On most issues that are close to the heart of the nationalists, such as the creation of a new city, Zulfikarabad, near Thatta, as an export processing zone mostly for Chinese manufacturers, influx of Punjabi and Pakhtun immigrants into Karachi and Sindh undermining the numerical majority of Sindhis in their homeland, distribution of water and other natural resources and, most importantly, the restructuring of the federation, Sharif has chosen to remain silent.

And this has been helpful for him in his core support base. So far, says Rizvi, the PMLN’s centrist politics in Punjab has not come into conflict with Sharif’s support for Sindhi nationalist causes. But in the future such a clash will be difficult to avoid. As and when the nationalists ask him to agree to a highly radical agenda in exchange for their support for the PMLN, he will be in trouble, Rizvi adds.

Nawaz Sharif, Ghous Ali Shah and Ismail Rahoo present at Fazil Rahoo’s death anniversary in Latif Rahoo, on May 2, 2010

Sharif knows he cannot always keep everyone happy. As soon as he starts taking a stance, he runs the risk of either losing his newfound allies in Sindh or getting ditched by his staunch supporters in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. But his ability to maintain a deliberate silence will severely be tested as election draws closer and his party comes up with a manifesto which may or may not satisfy his current and potential allies and possible voters in Sindh.

Some Sindhi nationalist groups like the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz–Bashir Qureshi Group, the Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party of Dr Qadir Magsi and Rasul Bux Palijo’s Awami Tehrik have already stayed away from any alliance with the PMLN and people like Halepoto are wary of Sharif’s rightwing, religious politics which they see as being pro-Taliban. “He will have to work very, very hard to shed the pro-Taliban tag, to become acceptable to the Sindhi middle class,” says Halepoto.

How will Sharif reconcile the political and economic interests of Punjab that his party has always represented since 1988 with the agenda of Sindhi nationalists whose support he is seeking to plot the downfall of the PPP-MQM combination — this is a million dollar question for which nobody seems to have a clear answer.
Rasheed argues that the question indeed does not exist. In his opinion, the nationalists are adopting the PMLN agenda rather than the PMLN having to agree to their demands. “We believe in resolving inter-provincial conflicts arising from growing demands on a shrinking economic pie. We have the ability to do so and in the past have demonstrated it. We believe in increasing the size of the pie so that the dispute on its sharing can be settled,” he says.

Rasheed claims that his party has already reviewed its stance on some issues which are anathema to the people in Sindh. The PMLN, for instance, has dropped its insistence on building Kalabagh Dam, he says. “Why pursue a controversial project when we have many other alternate hydropower and water storage options?” he says.

There is another important question that the PMLN needs to find an answer for: will its strategy in making electoral alliances with the Sindhi nationalist parties deliver it an election victory? Sindh’s election history since 1988 shows that the PPP has remained out of power in the province only when four different factors came together — the MQM, the powerful feudal political groups like the Mahars in Ghotki, Arbabs in Thar and Sherazis in Thatta, smaller parties like the National Peoples’ Party of the Jatois and the Pakistan Muslim League–Functional (PMLF) of Pir Pagara, and the military establishment and intelligence agencies. It was a combination of all these factors that helped Jam Sadiq Ali become the chief minister in 1990, Liaquat Jatoi in 1997 and Arbab Ghulam Rahim in 2004.

As the next election approaches, the MQM continues to stick close to President Asif Ali Zardari, the Mahars and Sherazis have already joined the PPP and the Jatois, Pir Pagara and the Arbabs are sitting on the fence — they cannot afford to ditch the ruling coalition unless the military establishment assures them that they will be a part of the next provincial government, regardless of who leads it. And, perhaps most crucially, there are no signals emerging from the army headquarters and the intelligence agencies as to which horses they will be backing in Sindh in 2013.

Rizvi, therefore, points out that the PMLN, which does not have a significant vote bank of its own in the province, needs to rope in powerful electable candidates like the Jatois, the Arbabs and the PMLF if it is aiming at giving the PPP a tough time. Banking on Sindhi nationalists will not help since they have been marginal players in the provincial electoral calculus and are expected to remain so in the next election. Halepoto agrees to this when he says Sharif has chosen a “riskier” path, in electoral terms, by joining hands with the nationalists. Even with a Bhutto in tow, he says, “it is not going to be easy for Sharif to win Sindh.”

Looking in all directions

In early May 2012, Nawaz Sharif was addressing a public gathering in Ratodero, a town in Larkana district synonymous with the Bhuttos. His host, too, was a Bhutto — Mumtaz Ali, a two-time chief minister of Sindh and the founding leader of his Sindh National Front (SNF) which has campaigned for a confederal Pakistan since 1989 and that has now merged with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN). And for the first time in his political career, Sharif made the surprising admission that he was in love with a Bhutto. “Nawaz Sharif loves Mumtaz Bhutto for standing by his principles.”
Along with this declaration, he mentioned two more things which confound more than they explain the relationship between his PMLN and Bhutto’s SNF. “Mumtaz says he has merged his party with our party; I say PMLN has merged with his party.” This was soon followed by another pronouncement of similarly sweeping nature: “I am pleased to know that Mumtaz’s stance on giving more rights and power to the provinces is same as PMLN’s.”

Mob rule

Protesting mobs in Lahore setting private and public property on fire. Photo by Arif Ali/White Star

An enraged crowd sets two vehicles on fire and beats the drivers black and blue after a road accident; when the police try to intervene, the mob assails them with bricks, stones, steel rods and clubs. They want instant justice: an eye for an eye, a life for a life. The drivers must be killed on the spot because they have hit and killed two local boys riding a motorcycle. Their lives are saved only after the elders of that area intervene and pacify the crowd.

This is what happened last month at Kamahan, a small village on the outskirts of Lahore. But this could have been a scene from anywhere in Punjab. The phenomenon of mob violence has repeated itself with frightening ferocity and frequency across the province in previous months and years. Whether it is about long hours of electricity load-shedding, a criminal caught in the midst of an act, a traffic accident or someone accused of having committed blasphemy, angry crowds are increasingly taking the law into their own hands, acting as accusers, prosecutors, judges and executioners, all rolled into one.

To many, mob violence may appear to be a ‘rural’ phenomenon, mostly involving ‘illiterate rustics’. But that cannot be farther from the truth. The supposedly more literate and ‘civilised’ sections of society, too, have frequently been resorting to such violence. Lawyers, for example, have often been in the news for mobbing judges, investigators and witnesses to influence court decisions in their favour. Last year, a group of lawyers supporting Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer’s assassin, harassed any lawyer who appeared as prosecutor in the case, thus delaying the hearing. More recently, lawyers beat a policeman on May 22 on the premises of the Lahore High Court.

The most affected victims of recent mob violence in Punjab, however, have been religious minorities such as Christians and Ahmedis. “It is always easy to whip up public emotions on religious issues,” a minority-rights activist tells the Herald. Christians have suffered a great deal at the hands of mobs inspired and led by religious groups, starting with large-scale arson and looting at the community’s houses in Shanti Nagar (near Khanewal) in February 1997 by an extremist jihadi organisation to deadly attacks on a Christian neighbourhood in Gojra in August 2009, he says. “Similarly, members of the Ahmedi community have faced mob attacks targeting places of worship in Lahore, Sialkot, Faisalabad and many other areas as part of this ongoing persecution. In most cases, the police have traced the involvement of different Punjab-based sectarian and jihadi groups in such mob attacks but no action has ever been taken to protect minorities from future attacks,” he adds.

Even outside the traditional majority-minority equation, society can be held hostage by mobs — due to the madness of a few. The most ominous part is that the audience also joins in to throw a few punches at the unfortunate target. “The passionate street theatre travels from town to town drawing an emotional response everywhere it goes. The audience becomes part of the play. It becomes a mob,” is how a newspaper editor comments on the phenomenon.

Saad Bashir, professor of psychiatry at Jinnah Hospital in Lahore, feels that mob violence is spawned by intolerance and aggression that have become part of our culture. “Rising mob rule signifies growing intolerance at a dangerous pace,” says Bashir. He adds that the failure of a society to fulfill the basic needs of people creates aggression in them. “Internalisation of aggression results in suicides and its externalisation [results] in violence.”
There is also no mystery behind the fact that rising mob rule is a product of the coming together of various crises – judicial, social, cultural and economic – which are faced by the state and society. “Growing economic pressures in recent years as well as the state’s failure to provide security and a functioning justice system to the people have aggravated these crises, spawned vigilante justice and entrenched mob rule in our daily life,” argues a political scientist wanting to remain anonymous, who works at a public sector university in Lahore.

He notes that the public’s waning trust in the increasingly dysfunctional police and judiciary, as well as in corrupt government departments and inefficient state institutions manifests itself in different forms, and this is not only in Punjab. “At one level we see frustrated people increasingly taking the law into their hands to punish real or imagined criminals because they do not trust the police and the judicial process. At another level, enraged crowds are damaging public property and attacking government functionaries because the state has failed to provide jobs, health care, education, electricity, and so on,” he contends (see The Protester Meets the Politician).

On a third level, “we find groups of disgruntled youth – such as the ones in Balochistan – taking up arms against the state to protest excesses and injustices,” against their community, adds the political scientist. “Then there are militant groups such as the Taliban who are at war with the state as well as the rest of their country because they think they have a solution to what plagues our society and country and want to impose it on everyone at gunpoint.” He points out that examples of mob justice can even be found in developed countries but “our unwillingness and inability to check [mobs] and punish those involved sets us apart from the rest of the world.”
Some explain the phenomenon of mob justice as a product of increasing distance between the common man and state institutions because of the public losing faith in the legitimacy and credibility of the state. Dr Mohammad Waseem, a professor of political science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, believes that people are increasingly taking the law into their hands because legitimate political forums for protest have been decimated into virtual irrelevance. “The absence or weakening of organised forums, such as Parliament and political parties, has complicated the situation. As a result of this, people are now venting by resorting to violence in the form of mobs,” he says.

Pakistan has had a long history of mob rule but the situation has become worse since the 1980s due to General Ziaul Haq’s policy of creating an ideology based on religious and tribal/clan values as well as vigilantism to subdue his opposition by promoting religious parties and groups supporting his rule. Political economist Ali Cheema points to the breakdown of secular community institutions such as panchayats due to changing social and economic conditions, and the collapse of state institutions such as the police and the judiciary have made the situation even more complex. “We have no institutional framework to control mob rule. Our political parties are in a vacuum; questions are being raised about the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions,” he says. “The government’s ability to mediate has eroded over time, civic space of congregation and dialogue has vanished and the parallel ideology [of vigilantism] is getting stronger. When minorities are attacked and women are killed by mobs in the name of Islam, it is considered legitimate,” he argues adding that violence has become a means of negotiations between the people and the state in the absence of civic, political and constitutional forums.

While all these factors can be applied across Pakistan, the case in Punjab has become more peculiar over the last few years because Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and his provincial government have contributed to the spread of vigilantism and mob justice through their policies, analysts conclude. In its eagerness to appear tough about crime, the Punjab government has at times endorsed the policy of killing alleged criminals in staged police encounters. As a consequence of this policy, many police officers often try to appear more ‘tough’ on crime by not only killing the criminals but also parading their bodies openly on the streets to ‘deter’ crime.

On April 13, 2010, for instance, the Gujranwala police killed two alleged robbers in an encounter and paraded their bodies on the G T Road. The police convoy was showered with flower petals and the then Deputy Inspector General of Police in Gujranwala, Zulfiqar Cheema, publicly praised the policemen who killed the alleged criminals. Little more than a month ago, the police killed two alleged robbers in the same city and paraded their bodies in the streets, with senior police officials commending the act and rewarding the policemen involved in the incident. On July 12, in the same year, an alleged child molester was shot dead by the police in Sialkot and his body was taken around the neighbourhood in the nearby Daska town.

Many commentators have warned over the years that such police actions would “further brutalise” society and the government’s implementation of its “political agenda over crime will encourage people to take the law into their own hands”. They were soon to be proved correct. Two teenage brothers riding through the village of Buttar in Sialkot on August 15, 2010, were beaten to death by a local mob, their bodies were hung upside down after the incident (see Sialkot’s Summer of Discontent).

In a re-enactment of the Sialkot lynching, two alleged robbers fell prey to mob justice in Multan on March 26 this year. One of them reportedly shot himself to avoid a painful death at the hands of the crowd. The other was pelted with stones until he died. The unfortunate aspect of these incidents is that police officials side with the mob, turning a blind eye to the brutal, instant punishments meted out to real or imagined criminals.

“Some [officials] believe that such incidents would deter crime while others use them as a vehicle for their rise in the department,” a senior police official, posted in a district near Lahore, tells the Herald. But, in his opinion, social and political sanctions for such acts of brutality are more to blame than the career ambitions of individual officials. “Everyone – people, police and politicians – somehow realise that our criminal justice system is not working. Little wonder then that … political authority looks the other way [when mob violence occurs] in the hope of controlling crime,” says the officer.

Another official, working as a district police officer adversely hit by recent power riots, agrees that the Sialkot lynching incident was a reminder of a breakdown in the criminal justice system. “People are angry because the criminal justice system has failed to give them security and justice,” he explains, adding that vigilante justice has become a dangerous alternative. “You cannot control vigilantism and mob rule without rewriting laws and improving governance,” he contends.

In a majority of incidents of mob violence – especially those involving a religious issue – the police choose to remain on the sidelines as silent spectators. “It is always a difficult situation for a police officer because there are no clear instructions on how to handle such situations. Our response usually varies from incident to incident. Sometimes we lack the courage and at other times we do not have the logistics,” says the district police officer. “If you fire at the unruly mob to control it, in the absence of clear-cut instructions from your seniors, the consequences for you can be quite serious. You may be sacked from your job or land up in the jail. If you don’t, you can be accused of neglecting your duty,” he says but admits that sometimes policemen also become a part of the mob as was seen in the Sialkot incident. “Our force is also a product of society. They also realise the inefficiencies and shortcomings of the justice system. You cannot solely blame them for becoming part of the mobs, no matter how wrong it is.”

As idealistic as this may sound, Cheema believes that mob rule cannot be controlled without reinforcing the state’s writ, restoring the government’s credibility and rebuilding community institutions to create space for dialogue and negotiations. All political parties will have to realise the infinite risks of giving in to mob rule and they will have to come together on this issue to reduce social, political and economic polarisation, he argues.

“The government must make it clear that mob rule and vigilantism are not acceptable in any form and on any issue. At the same time, the government should improve governance, enforce the rule of law, engage disgruntled sections of society to bridge the gap between them and the state, and fulfill the basic needs of education, health care, electricity and the like, says a political scientist belonging to a government university. “If mob justice is not checked now, it will grow into something even more dangerous in the foreseeable future,” he warns.

Mob rule

An enraged crowd sets two vehicles on fire and beats the drivers black and blue after a road accident; when the police try to intervene, the mob assails them with bricks, stones, steel rods and clubs. They want instant justice: an eye for an eye, a life for a life. The drivers must be killed on the spot because they have hit and killed two local boys riding a motorcycle. Their lives are saved only after the elders of that area intervene and pacify the crowd. This is what happened last month at Kamahan, a small village on the outskirts of Lahore. But this could have been a scene from anywhere in Punjab. The phenomenon of mob violence has repeated itself with frightening ferocity and frequency across the province in previous months and years. Whether it is about long hours of electricity load-shedding, a criminal caught in the midst of an act, a traffic accident or someone accused of having committed blasphemy, angry crowds are increasingly taking the law into their own hands, acting as accusers, prosecutors, judges and executioners, all rolled into one.

Show me the difference

PTI rally in Lahore attracts huge crowds

PTI rally in Lahore attracts huge crowds. Courtesy AFP.

The details of PakistanTehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI) agenda of change are, perhaps, the best guarded secret ofPakistan’s murky politics. All we have is at best a vague sketch of social, economic and administrative measures and at worst disjointed and random statements issued by PTI chief Imran Khan, mostly on the go. “Our agenda is the agenda ofPakistan. It is all in the newspapers. Everybody knows what the issues are,” says Dr Arif Alvi, PTI’s secretary general.

While this reliance on newspapers betrays a lack of proper homework on the issues facingPakistan, the solutions PTI suggests reveal at least some degree of populist naiveté. “[Everybody knows] where the solutions are. We don’t have to reinvent the wheel,” says Alvi. “All we need is [political] will and the [good] intention to fix the problems facing us.”

The PTI, according to him, will strive to makePakistanan Islamic welfare state in accordance with the sayings of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as enunciated in his speech onAugust 11, 1947. It is to be a place where everyone will have equal rights and opportunities regardless of religious or socio-economic standing, he says. “This should give you the broad contours of our programme, our manifesto,” Alvi explains.

The problem is everyone inPakistan, barring a few religious and nationalist parties, swears by Jinnah and turningPakistaninto an Islamic welfare state remains a political mantra except for a few regional parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Sindh. Even more essentially, the state as defined by Jinnah’s speech should have nothing to do with religion but an Islamic welfare state is nothing if it is not religious. How PTI reconciles this theoretical problem and its practical implications, in terms of an equal political and religious treatment of all Pakistanis regardless of their faith, will provide some clue to the party’s political philosophy. Will it ever ask for revoking the clearly discriminatory clauses of the 1973 Constitution which stop non-Muslims from becoming the head of the state or the government? What about the blasphemy laws and Hudood ordinance?

At a mundane level, why is PTI so reluctant to provide details of its programme? “We are not releasing the details because we do not want others to steal our programme, cut it and paste it as their own,” Alvi insists.

While such secrecy and vagueness has so far helped PTI to attract supporters from the opposite ends of political spectrum, the party’s critics and opponents say it shows that Khan as a politician is short on programme and long on political rhetoric. A Punjab-based federal minister of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) says, “Khan wants to do a [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto on us and on other political parties but without a political ideology to attract voters. He must be kidding.” Wanting to remain anonymous, the minister says Khan’s statements and speeches have impressed him the least. “What he said inLahorewas formless. Let him come up with a published manifesto and we will see how he is different from the rest of us and what he has to offer to different sections of society — businessmen, middle classes, peasants, working classes, minorities, women, etc,” he says.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Lahore-based political analyst agrees. “Khan does not have a plan of action,” he says. Even if he has a plan, as he claims he has, it raises the next question. “Does he also have the capacity, human resource and the will to implement what he plans to do?” asks Rizvi.

Khan’s answers to complex economic, political, social and strategic problems seem to come straight from the opinions and editorials pages of newspapers and television talk shows. He wants to makePakistanan energy-surplus and self-reliant economy by exploiting the country’s natural resources. That these natural resources require money, technology and elaborate political, administrative and environmental measures does not seem to matter. For instance, most ofPakistan’s natural gas and coal reserves happen to be in Balochistan and Sindh and after the 18th amendment to the Constitution no federal government can extract and use them without the consent of the provincial governments. Does Khan propose to bypass such constitutional niceties, risking further distrust between the provinces and the centre or will he be willing to take the long and painful route of creating a national consensus on how to extract and use these natural resources for the common good of the country? The devil certainly lies in detail.

Khan says he will force politicians to declare their foreign assets and will bring back 100 billion US dollars they have looted from the people and stashed away in the Swiss banks. The most glaring omission in this is that he fails to mention the money taken abroad by generals, judges, bureaucrats and businessmen. But even if one is willing to overlook that, it will take a suspension of disbelief to accept that Khan will succeed where military dictators – in spite of their totalitarian powers – failed to establish the link between political corruption, Swiss bank deposits and foreign assets.

His solution to the economic problems is both short and simple: “Pakistanloses 3,000 billion rupees annually to corruption and in unpaid taxes; if we succeed in stopping this loss (to the revenue) we can turn the economy around, woo fresh investment and achieve self-reliance,” he told theLahorerally. In an undocumented economy like Pakistan, it is difficult to say if his statistics are authentic but even if they are correct, doing something about them will help Pakistan only balance its budget — something that may be one of the many factors in an economic turnaround but cannot on its own put the economy on the right track. What about current account deficit, foreign loans, international and regional trade and, most importantly, a level playing field and an enabling environment?

Khan’s answer to the last is an end tothanaculture by depoliticising the police and abolishing patwaris  by digitising the land records. How he will achieve this acrossPakistanunless he has his party’s government in all the four provinces – both police and land records being provincial subjects – remains unknown. In an indication that he is not a fan of provincial autonomy, he opposes the 18th amendment which he says has concentrated too much power in the hands of the provincial chief executives. As a footnote to his centralising ideology, he talks about local governments without first talking about the devolution of power from the federal to the provincial level. This, again, has been a tried and tested policy of the military governments to avoid addressing the long-pending problems between the provinces and the centre as well as among the provinces.

In his Lahore rally, Khan pledged to remove the sense of alienation among the Baloch but did not say anything on the role of the military and bureaucratic establishment in creating this alienation, just as he did not touch the civil-military relations which lie at the core of many political crises that Pakistan has faced in the recent past.

”Khan is pandering to urban, educated middle-classes inPunjab. He has, therefore, focused on issues like governance and reflected what is close to [the hearts of] his followers,” argues Mohammad Waseem, a professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. “He and his party are relying on his personality and his rhetoric againstPPP, PMLN [Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz] and theUnited States,” says the professor.

Some commentators, however, are prepared to cut him some slack for not having firmed up his agenda of change yet. “Khan is just starting and theLahorerally was the first event to establish his credentials as a political force,” says Sajjad Naseer, a political science professor at the Lahore School of Economics. “As he moves forward and his campaign gathers momentum, he will crystallise his agenda,” he reflects.

He agrees with Khan that the real issue inPakistanat the moment is poor governance and corruption but he is dismayed with PTI because its leader is speaking only of political corruption and not of corruption among bureaucratic and other institutions of the state. “Accountability has to be across-the-board. You cannot be selective in accountability,” Naseer argues and then answers his own doubts. “Maybe Khan is not targeting others as a political tactic. Maybe, he will also start talking about institutional corruption when his campaign builds up.”

Ultimately, it is up to PTI and its leader to decide if he wants to end ambiguity and uncertainty about his political programme. The onus is on Khan to prove that he is different and possesses what it takes to bring about real change, says thePPPminister. For the time being, PTI may prefer to remain non-committal on the core issues facingPakistanso as to avoid alienating potential supporters.

In with the old

The search for electable candidates seems to have placed the former cricketer in a compromising position as he tries to translate his public support into votes. As PTI expands, it is changing its complexion. This was evident from Khan’s press conference, where men joining his party all came from Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid-e-Azam. According to a television journalist covering the event, it is only a matter of time when PTI will be indistinguishable from PMLQ or Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz as it continues embracing more electables.